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Introduction 
 
The regional setting 
 
On the one hand, southern Africa is one of the least violent regions in Africa from the 
standpoint of inter-state and intra-state war. On the other, southern Africa faces major 
human security and governance challenges that are eroding the region’s hard-won 
governance and stability gains. The region faces major human security threats; inequality 
and poverty are on the rise, and these factors make for prospects for serious social 
dislocation and conflict.  Former OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim said about 
southern Africa ‘…the region has experienced large-scale insecurity…This insecurity 
persists because the region has not yet managed effectively, human security challenges 
such as threats to civilians’ livelihoods, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, natural 
disasters, conflict in the DRC and Angola, trafficking of drugs and arms, and cross-border 
crime’1. Human security threats such as drug and arms, the flows of refugees and 
migrants, have indeed been regionalized in southern Africa2. 
 
Southern Africa’s political, development and security realities remain at once intertwined, 
contradictory and in a state of flux3; its politics is unstable and development is under 
severe stress. Democratization in the region is inconsistent and fragile. While more of the 
region’s states than ever before can be classified as formal democracies – in the sense 
that they adhere to the minimum requirement of democracy such as holding elections – 
the substance of democracy is far more unsteady. Typically, southern Africa states fair 
well on the minimum threshold of formal or procedural democracy – elections on time, 
distinction between three spheres of government, the separation of powers (between the 
legislature, judiciary and government), and opposition parties. But the region is fairing 
poorly when it comes to the strengthening of substantive democracy – the ability of states 
to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry, eradicate poverty, ensure the effective 
participation of the citizenry in decision-making and governance, tackling social injustice 
challenges such land dispossession and economic injustice’4.  
 
The gender relations of power typically receive scant attention in southern Africa; yet it is 
a key governance question in the sub-continent. The sub-region has a long way to go in 
introducing genuine empowerment of women; this is typically a male-dominated 
environment. The vexed question of youth and youth participation in politics in the region 
needs to receive similar attention. Youth are increasingly being alienated and marginalized 
from mainstream African politics. The issues just do not speak to them. For example, the 
issues of activism and cross-border youth political organization would help to shed light on 
the challenges of democratization and political governance in southern Africa.   
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Threats to democratic governance 
 
SADC and the southern African region has achieved a lot at the formal, 
procedural level, and at the realm of creating a regional institution and 
community in defence of peace, security, democracy and democratic 
governance. Norms, values and standards to regulate the behaviour of states 
have been introduced, even though there is a serious problem with enforcing 
such norms and values.  
 
However, at substantive level, democratic governance stresses, threats and 
obstacles have been most pronounced. This has been exacerbated by divisions 
amongst states and the debilitating conflicts throughout the region that have set 
back the consolidation and advancement of democratic governance.  
 
Southern Africa boasts fragile states. Obstacles facing the region include lack of 
consensus on the rules for stabilizing democratic governance within core 
democratic institutions; chaotic and fractious politics within and between parties; 
ineffective legislative policy making; lack of civil society capacity; inadequate 
implementation of the rule of law, particularly with respect to limiting corruption; 
slow progress in implementing gender equity; insufficient implementation of 
constitutionally guaranteed human rights; inadequate governmental policy 
implementation capacity, particularly with respect to agricultural and other 
dimensions of economic development; emasculation of provincial and local 
governmental autonomy; and insufficient care and nurturing of human resources 
through education, health care, and measures to counter HIV/AIDS.  
 
A major threat to governance and democratization is that posed by HIV/AIDS, 
and southern Africa is by far the region most affected by the pandemic. Prega 
Ramsamy, Executive Secretary of the SADC, stressed that ‘the pandemic 
continues to escalate in our Community. Available statistics indicate that the 
rates of infected people in the region could be as high as one in five in some 
member states. At least four member states have rates higher than 400 per 100, 
000 population, indicating the magnitude of the problem’v.  It is estimated that 
without HIV/AIDS, life expectancy would be around 59 years in southern Africa, 
16 years more than at presentvi. Some southern African statistics estimate that 
as much as 25% of the age cohort 15-49 – the productive and skilled age group 
– is infected in 12 African Countries. Seven out of these twelve countries are in 
southern Africavii. This makes southern Africa the most HIV/AIDS affected sub-
region in the world. Fifty five percent of all the infected people in southern Africa 
are women.  
 
The HIV/AIDS prevalence in the seven Southern African Countries in descending 
order is as followsviii: Botswana (38.8%), Zimbabwe (33.7%), Swaziland (33.4), 
Lesotho (31%), Namibia (22.5%) Zambia (21.5%). These percentages are 
expected to rise as it has increasingly become evident that HIV/AIDS has no 
natural limit. 
 
Historical injustices will continue to surface and create the conditions for conflict, 
and even war. The heated land debate in Zimbabwe has called into question the 
country’s political settlement, which brought liberation more than twenty-four 
years ago. But the question of whether political settlements constrain the 
freedom of action of governments after peace and liberation has dawned, affects 
more than just Zimbabwe; it is a vexed question faced by most states in the 
region. During the early 2004, the government in Windhoek, and also newly 
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elected president of Namibia, Ifikipunye Puhamba, gave notice that the Namibian 
government intends to accelerate its land restitution and reform processes.   
 
In countries that have recently gone through war, such as the DRC and Angola, 
there is a problem of former child soldiers, many who are associated with 
incredible levels of violence, that have left them severely traumatizedix. There is 
further, the challenge of having to reintegrate regular soldiers; securing 
livelihoods for demobilized soldiers; accommodating economic and political 
migrants, and the like.      
 
Pressures for internal democratic governance constantly jostle with tensions 
among states. Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), the recently ended war in Angola, civil conflict in Zimbabwe, 
tensions between Namibia and Botswana over the Caprivi, are examples. The 
region has seen a fragile peace processes in the DRC and the calm in Angola 
could easily come apart. Post-conflict peace-building challenges suggest that 
unless democratic governance processes and institutions and the legacies of war 
are addressed, war could easily return.   
 
Major economic stresses 
 
Democratisation tensions play themselves out against the backdrop of continued 
economic difficulty; this has impacted negatively on prospects for democratic 
governance. The development trajectory for the region does not look good and 
the region faces a poverty complex that is spiraling downwardsx. 
 
Southern Africa clearly faces a plethora of development challenges. While in 
recent years economic growth rates have reached the 2-8 percent levels, the 
promise of economic prospects in the region have been clearly overstated. Many 
states have been compelled to support ‘donor democracy’ and pursue neo-
classical economic policies that have not result in sustainable growth paths. Even 
in countries where growth has been high, economic growth typically happens 
from a low base; poor economic performance exacerbates poverty and 
compounds the development challenges.  
 
Income poverty is painfully slowxi, and there has been a net reduction in the 
region’s GDP per capitaxii.  The national average life expectancy rate of birth for 
southern Africa’s 200 million inhabitants is a paltry 42 years. Some 15 million 
southern Africans require food aid.  
 
Southern Africa faces a major problem with small arms and light weapons; these 
are typically used in organized crime operations by gangs in drug trafficking, car 
hijackings and diamond smuggling. Weapons are also typically used as 
`convertible currency’ by these criminalsxiii. Light weapons are typically leftovers 
from southern Africa’s past civil, inter-state and liberation wars. 
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Incongruous politics and conflict  
 
Regional Overview 
 
Formal democracy has been introduced in most of the region’s states – 
Swaziland, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are now the only 
two countries which are not ruled by governments chosen in multi-party 
elections. Indeed, in 2004 and 2005, ten southern African countries would have 
gone to the polls. In 2004, South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and 
Mozambique, and in 2005, we are likely to see Zimbabwe, maybe Angola, maybe 
the DRC, Mauritius and Tanzania. So, if the minimalist definition of democracy is 
used – elections on time – than most southern African countries can claim to be 
democracies.  
 
However, if substantive democracy is used as a barometer, than democratisation 
experiments in southern Africa are highly fragile, and the formal facade conceals 
more deep-seated governance challenges faced by the region. 
 
Botswana 
 
The multi-ethnic Botswana has not seen a change of government since 1965xiv. 
The BDP just won the elections…again. And the opposition remains severely 
weakened and splintered. While the BDP remains strong in the main because of 
its image as an effective manager of the economy and a consolidator of 
democracy, increasingly intra-party weakness and tensions have began to 
weaken itxv. Botswana is a highly unequal society and it faces a severe HIV-AIDS 
crisis.   
 
Mauritius 
 
Mauritius remains one of Africa’s strongest democracies, but it too has its 
challenges. It boasts one of the highest GDP per capita’s, and is ranked a 
middle-income country. Its citizens enjoy a relatively high standard of living, and 
primary and secondary education is free and compulsory. Mauritius’ politics 
constantly reveal both stability and combativeness. There are clear rules of the 
game; political parties accept the rules of political contestation and regular 
election, and the right of the people to subject political parties and politicians to 
accountability. But day-to-day interactions between political parties remain 
aggressive and cutthroat, and are often fractious and divisive.  
 
Mauritius is a diverse but politically unified country, in spite of social cleavages 
and inequalities. But there is a general absence of violent conflict in the country.    
 
Tanzania 
 
Tanzania is attempting to consolidate democratization against the backdrop of 
significant social and economic stresses; it remains one of the poorest countries 
in the world, with per capita income at a mere US $168 per year. The economy 
remains heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounts for 50% of GDP. The 
Mkapa government has sought to be more responsive to citizen demands by 
addressing the issues of entrenched corruption in the public sector. The 
opposition feels that the ruling party is increasingly behaving in an arrogant and 
heavy-handed fashion.  
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DRC 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faces enormous post-conflict peace-
building governance challenges. In April 2003, the Joseph Kabila government 
and rebel opposition forces signed an historic pact to bring about a government 
of national unity in that country. Forty-four groups, including armed factions, 
exiled political parties, and civil society groups, signed the ‘The Final Act’ at Sun 
City, South Africa. The signing of the peace deal heralded the end of the Inter-
Congolese Dialoguexvi. But major challenges still lay ahead. The war has resulted 
in weak institutions in Congo, with government’s reach stretching no further than 
the outskirts of Kinshasa. State-society relations are poor to the extent of being 
almost non-existent.  
 
There are no legitimate political institutions, and certainly no democratically 
rooted constitutional processxvii. Indeed, the incumbent leader has considerable 
emergency powers at his disposal. The country has a recent history of 
warlordism, and even after any election that might take place, the problem of 
rebels, spoilers and warlords will continue to haunt the country for a 
considerable period into the future. Indeed, there is an ongoing militarisation of 
society in spite of the peace process that is underway.    
 
The collapse of the economy has had a direct effect on the quality of life of the 
people, and the Congolese are today some of the poorest people in the world. 
This poverty and underdevelopment contain the seeds for possible future 
conflict.    
 
Mozambique  
 
Relations between the dominant parties in Mozambique are strained and there is 
a high degree of mistrust between Renamo and Frelimo; Renamo has even 
disputed the outcome of the first two elections in peacetime, the 1994 and 1999 
elections xviii. Renamo has often threatened with violence and to go back to the 
bush, and post-election disputes could follow the election in December.    
 
Even though economic growth stood at an impressive 8-9% over the past five 
years, making Mozambique one of the fastest growing economies in the world, 
such growth has occurred from a very low base. The country remains one of the 
poorest in the world. Like in other southern African states, poverty and inequality 
could threaten what is an already fragile democracy.    
 
Swaziland 
 
In Swaziland there continues to be a serious standoff between the monarchy and 
civil society movements, notably labour, which is seeking to democratize the 
country and replace monarchical rule with democratic governance. Political 
parties are banned in the country and civil society (especially of the opposition 
variety) are not only excluded from governance processes but are also harassed; 
many are driven into exile. So at a time when much attention is focused on 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland is a political powder keg, and there is not a great deal 
needed to ignite it. All the evidence points to a combustionable situation. In April 
2003, the Swazi chief justice resigned because of what he saw as a crisis 
between the modern court system in Swaziland and the country’s absolute 
monarchyxix. Pressures for and tensions over democratization could spill into 
violence in the years to come.  
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Angola 
 
Until the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the government and 
opposition in Angola had long interacted with each other through a drawn out 
war. The two sides were locked in a major civil war for twenty-seven years. 
Angola has not had an election since 1992. Savimbi’s death lead to the start of 
the formal peace process. But now that formal attempts at peace-making are 
underway the gains of the past two years could be reversed unless the legacy of 
war is addressed through democratic peace-building. Democratic peace-building 
involves the strengthening of democratic institutions and culture. Unless this 
form of peace-building is addressed, peace could prove short lived.  
 
Angolans remain some of the world’s poorest people, despite the fact that the 
country is endowed with an abundance of diamonds and oil. The threat of 
military conflict will continue to loom for many years. Several million people have 
been uprooted by the war and some 10 million landmines are buried in the 
country’s former war zones.  
 
Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is a young, fragile and impoverished democracy. The kingdom has never 
been in a position to provide employment to the bulk of its population. Because 
of poverty and underdevelopment, political contestation is highly combative and 
the stakes are typically high. Like in Malawi, for example, a seat in parliament is 
often seen as a source of income, and a job. The stakes are, therefore, very high 
in a poor democracy such as Lesotho, and over the past several years a 
proliferation of parties has occurred, resulting in the present complement of 19 
parties - all vying for seats in parliament. Because of the state’s inability to make 
funding available for political parties, this remains a contentious issue in 
Lesotho’s polity. 
 
Lesotho has, especially around the time of elections, a history of instability and 
violence. HIV/AIDS is on the increase. While the election of May 2002 was 
largely violence-free and even credible, because of the high stakes, politics in 
Lesotho remain frail and breakable. The fragile democracy needs to be rebuilt 
through the strengthening of democratic institutions, building of consensus, 
fostering of cooperation and coexistence, and just generally political 
reconciliation, notably between the ruling LCD party and the BNP, as well as 
other parties like the LPC.  
 
Zambia 
 
There has, for a long time, been a stalling of the democratisation process in 
Zambia – especially after the 1991 elections. Institutional failure has occurred in 
the country, resulting in the executive and the ruling party becoming the 
dominant forces in the country. The ruling MMD has gone out of its way to 
entrench its dominance; this was done mainly through removing the instruments 
of transparency and accountability. The power of the executive remains firmly 
entrenched. This lack of political accountability and executive dominance has ben 
accompanied by systemic corruption. Corruption in Zambia is probably the worst 
in the region. In one of the most pronounced attempts to solidify MMD 
dominance, President Fredrick Chiluba planned to change the constitution in 
order to allow him to stand for a third term. But this move was met with fierce 
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opposition, even from within the ranks of the ruling party; some even moved to 
form their own opposition parties. Other opposition parties such as the Forum for 
Democracy and Development (FDD), UNIP, and the United Party for National 
Development (UPND) all opposed the move. Church and student movements 
were in the vanguard of anti-third term campaigns. In the end, Chiluba was 
defeated at the hands of a vibrant civil society, led by the churches, labour and 
the students movement. The economy remains highly dependent on revenues 
from copper, corruption eats away at an un-diversified economy, and 
government lacks the revenue to sustain expenditure and, sometimes, salaries.   
 
Zimbabwe 
 
In Zimbabwe meanwhile, tensions between government and opposition forces 
over the state of democracy means that this erstwhile icon of stability is now one 
of the region’s most unstable states. Zanu-Pf has - for more than half a decade 
now - behaved like a disguised monarchy, and has also turned the country into a 
de facto one party state. It have come to increasingly rely on violence and 
intimidation to sustain its rule, and has now been turned into a virtual neo-
authoritarian regimexx.  
 
Zimbabwe has also experienced one of the worst economic meltdowns in recent 
memory. By 2001, unemployment stood at 60%xxi. Over the last several years 
since then this rate has worsened while the economy has contracted. The GDP 
per capita, which was US$471 in 2000, worsened over the next three years. 
Total foreign debt was estimated at US$4 billion. Many parts of rural Zimbabwe, 
notably Matabele land and Masivingo, are experiencing serious food shortages.  
 
While president Robert Mugabe has laid a stress on the social justice issue of 
land possession, dispossession and restitution, the opposition has squared with 
the state over the lack of democratic governance. Some examples of this lack of 
democratic governance is the repeated detention of journalists whose reports 
were unfavourable to the military establishment and the government. Even if the 
power political question can be addressed, one lesson from Zimbabwe is that the 
land question has emerged as one of the most pressing governance challenges 
facing southern Africa.  
 
Malawi 
 
Malawi, one of the poorest countries in Africa, is attempting to instill democracy 
against the backdrop of indebtedness, poverty, a vulnerable agricultural sector, 
and heavy dependence on foreign aid. Chronic malnutrition is a problem and 
HIV/AIDS affects some 25% of the sexually active population. Life expectancy, 
which now stands at 44 years of age, could drop even further because of the 
pandemic. Democratisation and governance thus occur in rather adverse 
conditions. These unsympathetic conditions could easily lead to conflict. 
 
Namibia 
 
In Namibia formal democracy remains robust - as evidenced by the recent 
elections. Swapo remains one of the region’s most dominant political parties and 
the recent results were largely accepted without question; the Electoral 
Commission got a clean bill of health in the November 2004 poll. But threats to 
its democracy are not likely to come from political contestation: they are more 
likely to come from socio-economic stresses. Like South Africa, Namibia is one of 
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the world’s most unequal societies. Nowhere is this inequality better illustrated 
than in the land question. The Namibian government, frustrated by its own slow 
pace of land reform, announced during early 2004 that it would accelerate the 
slow pace of expropriation of white farmsxxii. It made clear its intentions to do 
away with the ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ policy and replace it with the 
expropriation policyxxiii. Government blamed this shift on white farmers, who 
have ‘unfairly inflated the prices of farmland and become obdurate’xxiv. The 
statistics tell it all; white farmers, who makes up just 5% of the population, own 
sme 95,6% of all agricultural land.     
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa, which in April 2004 witnessed its third democratic elections on 
time, is often seen as the strongest democracy in the region. But it has major 
problems. While it has the largest, and most diversified and advanced economy 
in the region – with a GDP which accounts for some 80 per cent of the region’s 
economic output - and boasts an excellent infrastructurexxv, it faces severe socio-
economic problems. Its government presides over a deeply unequal society with 
acute poverty levels, unemployment rates of over 40%, poverty rates of some 
48%, and what president Mbeki called ‘two economies’ and ‘two nations’. All of 
which, in part, explains the levels of crime in the country. Government, 
particularly at provincial and local levels, has relatively weak state capacity.    
Conclusion 
 
The major challenges facing the region are the weakness of the state, coupled 
with poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and human security problems. Even 
the governance institutions put in place nationally and regionally (SADC) are 
weak. They typically fail to resolve differences within and amongst states. Also, 
states are jealous of their sovereignty, are reluctant to surrender some of it, and 
are even unwilling to pool some in favour of greater integration. Democratic 
governance in southern Africa is under stress and strain. The potential for 
conflict is, therefore, evident. 
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